FastVer2: A Provably Correct Monitor for Concurrent, Key-Value Stores

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Abstract

FastVer [4] is a protocol that uses a variety of memory-checking techniques to monitor the integrity of key-value stores with only a modest runtime cost. Arasu et al. formalize the high-level design of FastVer in the F* proof assistant and prove it correct. However, their formalization did not yield a provably correct implementation—FastVer is implemented in unverified C++ code.

In this work, we present FastVer2, a low-level, concurrent implementation of FastVer in Steel, an F* DSL based on concurrent separation logic that produces C code, and prove it correct with respect to FastVer's high-level specification. Our proof is the first end-to-end system proven using Steel, and in doing so we contribute new ghost-state constructions for reasoning about monotonic state. Our proof also uncovered a few bugs in the implementation of FastVer.

We evaluate FastVer2 by comparing it against FastVer. Although our verified monitor is slower in absolute terms than the unverified code, its performance also scales linearly with the number of cores, yielding a throughput of more than 10M op/sec. We identify several opportunities for performance improvement, and expect to address these in the future.

1 Introduction

Consider a system consisting of a key-value store service and a set of clients, whose interactions are represented by a trace of request-response pairs of the form put k v (to update the value of key k to v) or get k v (to fetch the current value of k, to which the service’s response is v). The clients may be skeptical that the service properly stores and retrieves their data, either due to the service operator being malicious or due to bugs in the implementation of the service. We would like to offer clients a guarantee such as sequential consistency, i.e., that every get on a key k returns the value of the most recent preceding put k v.

One way to approach this goal is to formally verify the implementation of the service and prove that it always ensures this property, and then to prove to the client (e.g., using a cryptographically authenticated trusted execution environment (TEE)) that the service is running exactly the verified code. However, a formal proof of a high-performance, concurrent, key-value store is difficult and generally requires
This paper presents FastVer2, a provably correct, low-level, concurrent implementation of FastVer. FastVer2’s executable code consists of about 4,100 lines of concurrent C code extracted from Steel [11], an F* DSL based on a concurrent separation logic called SteelCore [25]. Additionally, FastVer2 uses provably correct parsers and serializers produced by the EverParse parser generator [22], and about 1,000 lines of C code for provably correct cryptographic primitives from the EverCrypt [20] cryptographic provider. We expect to make all our code public and available from https://aka.ms/zeta. Our main contributions are highlighted below.

**New ghost-state abstractions for concurrency proofs.** We design and implement a scheme for multiple verifier threads to compute concurrently and for them to periodically share their results for aggregation. To structure our proofs of this concurrency pattern, we rely on SteelCore’s support for ghost state based on partial commutative monoids (PCMs), and introduce a new PCM for refined, monotonic state called the fractional anchored preorder, or FRAP.

**An incremental, asynchronous API.** We design a monitor API that is suitable for incremental use by the service. The service can repeatedly choose a thread on which to run a verifier, feeding it a trace of operations to be verified. Separately and asynchronously, the context can query the monitor, possibly on a separate thread, to determine the epoch up to which verification has completed.

**Hardware protections from a TEE.** Overall, FastVer2’s design philosophy is to verify the verifier. That is, FastVer’s monitor offers a runtime memory verification protocol, while FastVer2 ensures that that protocol is implemented correctly. FastVer2’s C code has no external runtime dependences and is designed to be executable within a TEE, such as an Intel SGX enclave. Our top-level API is also designed for safe usage in an untrusted context. As such, based on trust in the hardware, a skeptical client can be sure that the execution of an untrusted service is correctly monitored by high-assurance, formally proven code.

**Evaluation.** We evaluate FastVer2 by integrating our monitor with the Faster key-value store [7]. We find that the throughput of Faster with our verified monitor is 5x less than the throughput of Faster with the unverified FastVer monitor. Even then, FastVer2 achieves a throughput exceeding 10M ops/sec, which is 2-3 orders of magnitude better than existing formally verified key-value database [13]. As with FastVer, the throughput of FastVer2 scales roughly linearly with the number of CPU cores. We identify the reasons for FastVer2’s performance drop (the main reason being FastVer’s use of hardware-accelerated cryptography, which FastVer2 currently lacks), and ways to bridge the gap.

## 2 Guarantees and Trust Assumptions

Our overall goal is to securely monitor a key-value store service executing potentially buggy code in a potentially...
malicious environment, providing correctness and integrity guarantees—confidentiality is not in scope. We describe the main guarantee that FastVer2 offers, some basic trust assumptions on the tools we use, the deployment environment, and the roles of the various participants in the system.

2.1 A Client’s View of the System

Consider a set of clients $\overline{C}$, where each client $C_i$ has a unique identifier $i$, interacting with a key-value store service. Typically, for scalability, the service is implemented using multiple instances or threads and multiple clients can interact with the service concurrently. Nevertheless, clients expect the service to behave as a single logical key-value store.

From $C_i$’s perspective, its interactions with the service $S$ so far can be modeled as a log of executed operations $L_i = \overline{op}$, tagged with the client’s identifier $i$ and a client-specific sequence number $n$, where the sequence number of an item $op$ in $L_i$ is greater than the sequence number of all preceding items. The operations $op$ themselves are either:

- $get_{i,n} k v$, a request to fetch the current value of a key $k$ with the service’s response $v$;
- $put_{i,n} k v$, a request to update the value of $k$ to $v$

When the client identifier and sequence numbers are irrelevant, we simply write $get k v$ and $put k v$. Additionally, we write $op_{i,m}$ to mean some operation from client $i$ with sequence number $n$. Collectively, the state of all the clients $\overline{C}$ is represented by all their logs $\overline{L}$.

Our overall goal is to guarantee that all the clients logs $\overline{L}$ can be interleaved in a sequentially consistent manner.

Definition 2.1. Formally, we say that a log of client operations $I$ is sequentially consistent if and only if

- For every $op_{i,n} \in I$, if it is preceded by an operation $op_{i,m} \in I$, then $m < n$, i.e., the sequence numbers for each client $i$ are monotonically increasing; and,
- For every get $k v$ in $I$ at position $n$, there exists a preceding operation put $k v$ in $I$ at position $m < n$ and none of the operations in $I$ between $m + 1$ and $n$ are of the form put $k _-$, i.e., each get returns the value of the most recent put on the same key.

FastVer2 Trust Assumptions (Attacker Model). Clients should not need to place any trust in the implementation of the service $S$ nor in any modifications made to $S$ in support of its integration with the FastVer2 monitor. However, clients must be assured that the implementation of the monitor $M$ correctly enforces the desired safety property, namely, it only accepts sequentially consistent executions of the service. To provide this assurance, we formally prove the correctness of the low-level, concurrent implementation of $M$ in $F^*$. As such, clients only need to trust the specification of the main theorem of our development, the $F^*$ toolchain, which includes the Z3 SMT solver [10], as well as the C compiler we use to compile the code emitted by $F^*$.

Further, although the implementation of the monitor is verified, to ensure that the runtime execution environment of the monitor is trustworthy, we execute the fully verified code of the monitor within a trusted execution environment (TEE). As such, based on trust in the underlying hardware protection mechanisms, the client can assume that the monitor is indeed executing only the verified code. This also protects against bugs in the untrusted service from compromising the correctness of the monitor, since hardware protections isolate $S$ and $M$.

A deployment of FastVer2 would also require distributing keys to authenticate clients, though this is beyond the scope of this paper.

3 The Design of FastVer

The implementation of FastVer2 is proven correct against a formal specification of the design of FastVer, developed previously by some of the present authors in $F^*$. At the core of FastVer is a multi-threaded monitor $M$ consisting of several verifier threads $\overline{V}$. The number of verifier threads is an initialization parameter—verifier threads cannot be created dynamically after initialization. Each verifier thread $V_i$ has a unique identifier $i$ and maintains some thread local state. The threads can interact with each other through some shared state $A$ (for aggregate state). Taken together, the verifier’s local and aggregate state are an authenticated abstraction [27] of the entire state of $S$, using a combination of hardware protection and cryptographic techniques.

While the formal specification of FastVer is precise, it is not designed for efficient execution. To begin with, the specification is in the purely functional, mathematical fragment of $F^*$, and compiling it for execution would require the use of OCaml and its garbage collector—aside from efficiency concerns, this would also require placing the OCaml runtime system within the TEE and TCB. More fundamentally, while FastVer formally specifies the operational behavior of individual verifier threads, it leaves the interaction of the threads underspecified, presuming that the state of multiple threads can be aggregated omnisciently. The main effort in building FastVer2 was to, first, refine the purely functional specification of FastVer’s verifier threads (through several refinement layers) into efficient, imperative code implemented in Steel; and, second, design and implement a scheme whereby the verified threads safely and correctly manage their aggregate state to compute the overall monitor verification result.

Verifier Logs. A basic abstraction offered by FastVer is the notion of verifier logs. The service $S$ is modified to interact with the monitor by periodically sending a log of operations $L_i$ to some verifier thread $V_i$, e.g., by calling an operation verify-log $i L_i$ on the monitor. To process $L_i$, the verifier thread $V_i$ resumes executing in the TEE and processes each operation in $L_i$ sequentially. These logs include client-facing operations $op$ that the service $S$ has processed, and it is $V_i$’s
task to certify that \(op\) was executed correctly by the service; it does so by evaluating \(op\) with respect to the current authenticated abstraction of the service state. However, in addition to the two client operations get and put, the verifier offers an API with seven additional operations, as shown below, which the service uses to safely manipulate the verifier’s authenticated state and to prove to the verifier that the client’s operation was indeed processed correctly.

\[
\text{vop ::= get } k v s s' | \text{ put } k v s s' | \text{ addm } s s' r | \text{ evictm } s s' | \text{ addb } r s t i | \text{ evictb } s t \mid \text{ hybrid bm } \mid \text{ evictbm } s s' | \text{ nextepoch } | \text{ verifyepoch }
\]

Client ops

Merkle ops

Blum multiset hash ops

Hybrid Blum-Merkle op

Epoch lifecycle ops

To maintain its authenticated data structure, FastVer uses three ingredients: 1. A thread-local verifier cache: Each verifier thread uses a small amount of hardware-protected memory to store a cache of records currently being processed; 2. A sparse, incremental Merkle tree [17] authenticates the state of the entire key-value store and the root of the tree is stored in the cache of a designated verifier thread; and 3. FastVer uses a deferred memory checking technique developed initially by Blum et al. [5], but with several enhancements, to support concurrent access of records in multiple threads.

Each of these techniques on its own presents a formalization challenge, particularly for an efficient, concurrent implementation. The combination of the three, together with the subtle ways in which they interact, is decidedly non-trivial.

3.1 An Informal Overview of the FastVer Protocol

A client operation (get or put) as seen by a verifier thread \(V_i\) is decorated with two slot identifiers \(s\) and \(s'\). A verifier’s thread-local cache \(V_i.\sigma\) is a partial map from slot identifiers (some small bounded integer type, e.g., our implementation uses a 16-bit unsigned integer), to one of several kinds of values, including key-value pairs, representing the currently stored tuple \(KV(k,v)\) in the underlying service \(S\).

Client operations: get and put. To evaluate get \(k v s s'\), \(V_i\) checks that \(V_i.\sigma s = KV(k,v)\), to ensure that \(s\) is indeed the current value of \(k\) in \(S\). When evaluating put \(k v s s'\), \(V_i\) updates \(V_i.\sigma s\) to contain \(KV(k,v)\), to reflect the state change in \(S\) into \(V_i.\sigma\)’s authenticated abstraction. If any of these checks fail, \(V_i\) stops processing the log and aborts. Put another way, each client operation executed by the service \(S\) is shadowed by an execution in some verifier thread \(V_i\) of the same operation, where the cache \(V_i.\sigma\) holds the concrete key/value mapping in hardware-protected memory.

Of course, the total number of key-value mappings maintained by \(S\) may far exceed what can be stored by \(V_i\) in memory—\(S\) may hold petabytes of data, while \(V_i.\sigma\) only has \(2^{16}\) slots. A limitation of the FastVer specification is that it assumes that the space of slots identifiers is sufficiently large to index the entire key-value store, an unrealistic assumption. One of the first steps in our development is to introduce an intermediate specification layer that uses a smaller space of slots and a sub-protocol to manage the use of slot identifiers—we prove that this intermediate layer refines the original FastVer specification.

From our intermediate layer, the rest of the FastVer protocol is arranged so that the service \(S\) can load into \(V_i.\sigma\) the values of key/value tuples that it intends to access before accessing them; and, further, once the service deems that the tuple \((k,v)\) is "cold" (meaning that it is not likely to be accessed again soon), it can issue instructions to \(V_i\) to unload \((k,v)\) from the cache and instead protect its value using one of the cryptographic techniques that the verifier supports, e.g., sparse Merkle trees or Blum multiset hashes.

Merkle Operations: addm and evictm. FastVer uses a sparse, incremental, Merkle tree to authenticate records that cannot be held in the cache. Keys in FastVer are of two classes. Data keys are 256-bit values that are used by clients of the key-value store \(S\) to reference their data. Keys of shorter lengths are Merkle keys. The structure of keys imposes a hierarchy among them. The hash at the root of the tree authenticates all the key-value pairs in the system.

There are various subtleties involved on top of this basic construction. For example, since many data keys may not be used, the construction has to be sparse, e.g., a node may not have both its children. Further, when updating the value stored at a given key, rather than propagating hash updates all the way to the root of the tree, FastVer supports incremental updates, where the hash change is propagated only as far as some intermediate node in the tree, allowing updates confined to some sub-tree to be batched and propagated further up the tree only when the batch is completed.

An addm \(s s' r\) operation aims to add the record \(r\) to \(V_i.\sigma\) at slot \(s\). The record \(r\) may be, say, a key-value pair for a data key \(KV(k,v)\) (it may also be a record for some internal Merkle node). However, to add this record to the cache, \(S\) must prove to \(V_i\) that \(KV(k,v)\) is a valid tuple in the service’s current state—allowing the service to load some invalid tuple in the \(V_i\)’s cache would break the authenticated abstraction of \(S\)’s state. So, to prove that \(KV(k,v)\) is a valid tuple, the service \(S\) also provides a slot identifier \(s'\) which references a cache entry in \(V_i.\sigma\)’s state that holds a Merkle record \(p = MK(k',h_0,h_1)\) for the parent node of \(k\) in the Merkle tree, i.e., \(k\) is the \(b\)-child of \(k'\). To successfully load \(KV(k,v)\) at a vacant slot \(s\), \(V_i\) checks that the hash of \(s\) is equal to \(h_0\), establishing that \(s\) is indeed the current value of \(k\) in the authenticated abstraction. Further checks are also needed to ensure that \(KV(k,v)\) has not already been loaded into some other slot \(s''\) of the cache.

Conversely, the operation evictm \(s s'\) aims to remove the record stored at slot \(s\) in the \(V_i.\sigma\). However, the value stored at slot \(s\), say \(KV(k,v)\) is precious—it represents the
current value of some tuple in the state, and if a record for key \( k \) were to be loaded subsequently, it must be identical to the value being evicted now. As such, when evaluating \( \text{evictm} \ s \ s' \), \( V_i \) checks that the slot \( s' \) holds a Merkle record \( p = \text{MK}(k', h_0, h_1) \), where \( k \) is the \( b \)-child of \( k' \); it updates the slot \( s' \) by setting \( p, h_2 \) to hash \( v \), ensuring that the current value of \( k \) is now protected by the Merkle tree; and then removes \( s \) from \( \sigma \).

**Verifier epochs.** The interaction of the service with the verifier threads is structured into epochs, a grouping of operations according to a logical notion of time. The internal state of each verifier thread \( V_i \) includes a logical clock \( t_i \) a non-negative integer epoch \( e_i \) and a non-negative integer tick counter \( c_i \), where the pair \((e_i, c_i)\) increases monotonically, in lexicographic order, with the clock initialized to \((0, 0)\). We write \( \text{tick}(e, c) \) for \((e, c + 1)\), and \( \text{next}(e, c) \) for \((e + 1, 0)\), and \( \text{epoch}(e, c) \) for \( e \).

When processing \( \text{nextepoch}_i \), \( V_i \) updates its clock from \( t_i \) to next \( t_i \). Some of the Blum operations discussed below can also advance the clock. Overall, this means that a verifier log \( L_i \) can be partitioned into several sub-sequences of operations, \( L_{i,0}, \ldots, L_{i,n} \), from the initial epoch 0 to the current epoch \( n \) of verifier \( V_i \), where each sub-sequence \( L_{i,j} \) is the set of operations evaluated by \( V_i \) while its clock was in epoch \( j \). We write \( L \vert_{i,n} \) for the prefix of \( L \) up to (and including) all operations in epoch \( n \).

The \( \text{verifyepoch} \) operation is more subtle and involves \( V_i \) propagating some portion of its local state to the aggregate thread state \( A \)—we describe this in detail shortly.

**Blum Operations.** For efficiency, it is useful to allow the service to speculatively add a record \( r \) to a verifier’s cache, and only later (e.g., at an epoch boundary) prove to the verifier that \( r \) was valid. The Blum operations offer such a deferred memory verification scheme.

Conceptually, the local state of each verifier thread \( V_i \) includes two additional fields per epoch, the add-set and the evict-set, both of which represent a multiset of triples \((r, t, i)\), where \( r \) is a data or Merkle record; \( t \) is a timestamp; and \( i \) is a thread identifier. Both these multisets are initially empty.

The service can request \( V_i \) to evaluate \( \text{addb} \ r s t j \) to speculatively load the record \( r \) at slot \( s \) in the cache \( \sigma \), and \( V_i \) checks that slot \( s \) is vacant; then adds \((r, t, j)\) to its add-set for epoch \( t \); updates its clock \( t_i \) to \( \text{max}(t_i, \text{tick}(t)) \); and finally updates \( \sigma \) at \( s \) with \( r \), while recording a bit in the cache that \( s \) was added speculatively using an \( \text{addb} \).

To evict a slot \( s \), \( S \) can request \( V_i \) to evaluate an evictb \( s t \) operation, which \( V_i \) does by adding the triple \((\sigma s, t, i)\) to its evict-set for epoch \( t \), after checking first that \( \sigma s \) is marked as having been added speculatively using an \( \text{addb} \); that \( t \) is greater than \( V_i \)'s current clock; and updates the clock to \( t \).

**Completing an epoch.** When evaluating a \( \text{verifyepoch} \), thread \( V_i \) copies its add-set and evict-set for the next epoch to be verified into the aggregate state \( A \), which contains a per-epoch array of add and evict sets for each thread. When all threads have completed evaluating an epoch \( e \), the monitor checks that the union of all the add-sets (of all the verifier threads) is equal to the union of all their evict-sets for epoch \( e \). If this check succeeds, then the monitor is convinced that all the speculative adds evaluated in epoch \( e \) were correct. Finally, since the only operations performed on these multisets is to union them and test them for equality, rather than materialize the multiset itself (which could require a large amount of storage), we approximate the multiset using a collision-resistant multiset hash, where \( \text{hash}(m \cup m') = \text{hash } m \oplus \text{hash } m' \), and \( \text{hash } m = \text{hash } m' \) if and only if \( m = m' \), except with negligible probability.

Now, for some intuition for why this scheme is correct. For a speculative \( \text{addb} \ r s t j \) to be accepted at \( V_i \), since we will have an entry \((r, t, j)\) in the add-set of \( V_i \) for the epoch of \( t \), we must also have an the same entry \((r, t, j)\) in the evict-set of \( V_j \) in the same epoch. However, for evict-set of \( V_j \) to contain \((r, t, j)\), \( V_j \) must have evaluated an \( \text{evictb} \) (or an \( \text{evictbm} \), as we’ll see shortly). If it was an \( \text{evictb} \ s' t \) then \( r \) must have been in the \( V_j \sigma \) at slot \( s' \); and that slot must have been marked as having been added speculatively using an \( \text{addb} \) with a smaller timestamp (a key aspect of our proof), and since the timestamp has decreased, our correctness argument can proceed by induction. But, we also have a base case, which is where the Merkle and Blum schemes interact, in the \( \text{evictbm} \) operation, as we’ll see next.

**Moving Records from the Merkle Tree to Blum.** The final operation in the verifier’s interface is \( \text{evictbm} \ s s' t \), which allows adding the record \( r \) stored at \( s \) and authenticated by the Merkle tree to be added to the \( V_i \)'s evict-set for epoch \( t \) as \((r, t, i)\). Migrating records out of the Merkle tree enables the service to start speculatively adding values for records and deferring their verification until the relevant epoch is completed. As such, \( \text{evictbm} \ s s' t \) is the base case of the inductive argument that justifies the correctness of a speculative \( \text{addb} \). However, since the record \( r \) added to the evict-set in an \( \text{evictbm} \) is authenticated by the Merkle tree, we can conclude that \( r \) is indeed a valid.

Making all this work requires handling many more subtleties. However, we leave these details to our formalization, hoping that our informal explanation here provides the reader with a broad sense of the entire protocol.

### 3.2 The FastVer Theorem

The FastVer specification has the following main elements (we use the concrete syntax of F* here, which is modeled after OCaml, and we explain potentially unfamiliar notation as we go; Appendix A provides a brief syntax primer):

**Single-thread specification.** The functional specification of a single verifier thread is given by \( \text{verify} \_ \sigma \_m \), which
processes a log of entries provided by the service while transforming its thread-local state vs:tsm (for thread-state model).

```plaintext
val verify_model (vs:tsm) (log:seq log_entry) : tsm
```

The thread-local state tsm contains a number of fields—we show its main elements below, including a fixed thread_id; a bit failed to record if log verification has failed; and a cache representing the hardware-protected, thread-local verifier cache. The internal state of each verifier thread also includes a logical clock. Operations processed by a thread are grouped into epochs, and for each epoch the verifier maintains some epoch_hashes.

```plaintext
type tsm = { thread_id:tid; failed:bool; cache:store;
  clock:timestamp; epoch_hashes:epoch_hashes;
  last_verified_epoch:option epoch_id; ... }
```

**Sequentially consistent except for hash collisions.** Given the logs for each of the verifier threads, the state of all the threads is described by verifier_states

```plaintext
let verifier_states (logs:seq (seq log_entry)) : seq tsm =
  Seq.mapi (λ i → verify_model (init i)) logs
```

The predicate epoch_ok i logs (below) asserts that all entries in the logs up to epoch i have been verified. This involves running the verifiers on their logs, conceptually in parallel. If none of the verifiers have failed, and if all of them have advanced their last_verified_epoch beyond epoch i, then if the add_set_hash and the evict_set_hash (aggregations of the hashes computed by each verifier thread for that epoch) are equal, then we declare that epoch i has been verified.

```plaintext
let epoch_ok (i:epoch) (logs: seq (seq log_entry)) =
  let vs = verifier_states logs in
  (∀ v ∈ vs. (~ v.failed) ∧ epoch_is_complete i v) ∧
  let add_set_hash, evict_set_hash =
    aggregate (Seq.map (λ v → v.epoch_hashes.[i]) vs) in
  add_set_hash == evict_set_hash
```

The main theorem states that if the logs have been validated up to epoch i, then if they are not sequentially consistent we can construct a hash collision, i.e., a pair of values v1 and v2 such that v1 ≠ v2 but hash v1 = hash v2.

```plaintext
let seq_consistent (logs: seq (seq log_entry)) = ... // Definition 2.1
val not_sc_implies_hash_collision (i:epoch)
  (logs: seq (seq log_entry)) (epoch_ok i logs ∧
   ¬ (seq_consistent_up_to i logs))) : hash_collision
```

## 4 FastVer2: Implementing FastVer in Steel

The top-level API of FastVer2 contains three functions: init initializes N verifier threads; verify_log allows the context (the untrusted service) to pass in a log of operations to be verified on a given thread i < N; and max_certified_epoch allows the context to query the monitor (on some thread) to determine the maximum epoch up to which the logs have been checked so far.

To state the correctness of this concurrent API, and to maintain its core invariants, we needed to build some specification and proof libraries in Steel. We start our description of FastVer2 by presenting its state and synchronization patterns informally, motivating a new ghost-state construction, the fractional anchored preorder PCM.

### 4.1 Shape of the State

Figure 1 depicts, informally, the state of the system. We have several verifier threads. Each thread’s state is described by a ghost log of operations that it has processed so far; as a thread processes an operation, it updates this log to indicate the progress. These thread-specific ghost logs are the backbone of our invariant: we use them to state the main functional correctness property of each thread, namely that a thread’s current state is related to what is computed by the verify_model specification on the ghost log of operations it has processed so far.

In addition to the thread-local state, we have some concrete state shared among all the threads. Each time a thread processes a VerifyEpoch operation to complete an epoch, it copies, or commits, some of its local state (the add and evict hashes for that epoch) to the shared state. An invariant (shown in the figure by the black (ghost) pointers) relates the shared state to the thread-local logs. For example, the figure shows that the shared state is up to date with the log of V̄ _i for all epochs up to epoch 2, and epoch 1 for V̄ _n. If all threads have committed their add and evict hashes for an epoch e to the shared state, another thread can combine and check those hashes and signal whether epoch e has been certified.
Some state transitions. When a thread $V_i$ processes an operation, it updates its log to record this fact. As such, $V_i$ requires write permission to its log. However, ghost references from the shared state also reference this log. In most traditional ownership-based program logics, this poses a challenge: updates to the state require exclusive ownership, yet here $V_i$ needs to update its log, even though it does not exclusively own it. But, in this case $V_i$ only appends to its log, i.e., the log grows monotonically. As such, as long as the invariant on the shared state only references a prefix of $V_i$’s log and is stable with respect to log append operations, $V_i$ should be able to safely update its ghost state.

SteelCore, like some other modern separation logics, supports user-defined ghost state based on partial commutative monoids (PCMs). These ghost state abstractions allow expressing various kinds of spatial and temporal disciplines on multiple components (e.g., threads or modules) to express knowledge about shared resources. One such abstraction is a PCM for monotonic state that supports such knowledge-preserving, shared state updates—others have explored such constructions before [3, 19, 28], including in libraries for Steel [25] that we use here. A PCM for monotonic state also enables taking logical snapshots of the system, which is useful to make irrevocable assertions that, say, all operations processed by the system up to some epoch have been certified and will remain so regardless of how the system evolves. This enables the monitor to issue definitive persistent attestations of these facts using, say, digital signatures.

Unfortunately, just a regular monotonic state PCM is not sufficient here. Consider what happens when a thread $V_i$ reaches an epoch boundary, completing epoch $e$. At this point, it needs to update the shared state for epoch $e$ and the ghost references pointing back to its log from the shared state to reflect that the shared state is synchronized with its log up to epoch $e$. To do this in an invariant-preserving way, thread $V_i$ has to “know” that the shared state is already synchronized with its state all the way up to its previous epoch $e−1$. It is not enough for the invariant to only maintain that the shared state is consistent with a prefix of $V_i$’s log; we need to prove that the shared state is not “too far behind” the state of each thread.

One possibility is to record in concrete state the last epoch that each thread has committed to the shared state, and when committing a given epoch $e$, we use a runtime check to confirm that the $e$ is indeed the next epoch. However, such a runtime check is inefficient, and besides, we can prove that it is not necessary—we just need the right ghost-state abstraction. Towards this end, we design and implement a PCM, which we call the fractional anchored preorder, or FRAP, and use it to model FastVer2’s ghost state. The next three sections, §4.2, §4.3, and §4.4, describe this construction and require some familiarity with separation logic—readers interested more in our main theorem and less in its proof could skip ahead to §4.5

4.2 The Fractional Anchored Preorder PCM

A PCM in Steel is a typeclass. A pre_pcm $a$ provides operations to compose elements of a that are composable, and a unit for the operation one. The type pcm $a$ associates with pre_pcm properties that ensure that the operation is associative and commutative, that one is really a unit, and a further property, refine which distinguishes a subtype of $a$, which we’ll see in use, shortly.

```
type pre_pcm a = { composable: symrel a; one:a;
  op: x:a → y:a(composable x y) → a; }
type pcm a = { p:pre_pcm a; comm:commutative p;
  assoc: assoc p; is_unit: is_unit p; refine: a → prop }
```

Given a pcm $a$, Steel allows allocating a ghost reference $r:G.ref p$, a reference to mutable ghost state holding a value of type $v_a$, and to state assertions of the form $G.pts_to r v$, as in the case of $G.alloc$ below, where ghost references can be initialized with refined values from a PCM $p$ [25].

```
val G.alloc (#a:Type) (#p:pcm a) (v:a { p.refine v }) : STG (G.ref p) 
  (requires emp)
  (ensures λr → G.pts_to r v)
```

The signature shown above is a specification in Steel, where the type $STG t p q$ is a computation type (similar to Hoare Type Theory [18]) describing a total correctness specification of a ghost computation which when called in an initial state validating the separation logic proposition $p$, returns a value of type $v t$ in a final state validating $q v$. In Steel, the type of separation logic propositions is $vprop$, and so, $v\_vprop$ and $q:t \rightarrow vprop$. To emphasize the role of $p$ and $q$ as pre- and postconditions, we often decorate them with the $F$ keywords requires and ensures, respectively. The *-sign marks an implicit argument in $F^*$. We often omit implicit binders, adopting a convention that unbound names are implicitly universally bound at the top of the definition. Steel also offers the computation type $ST a p q$, a Hoare-style partial correctness specification for a concrete (non-ghost) computation.

The crucial bit with ghost references to PCMs is that $G.pts_to r (v_0 \_op\_v_1)$ is equivalent to $G.pts_to r v_0 \_G.pts_to r v_1$, as the following two lemmas show.

```
val share (r:G.ref p) : STG unit
  (requires G.pts_to r (v_0 \_op \_v_1))
  (ensures λr → G.pts_to r v_0 \_G.pts_to r v_1))
val gather (r:G.ref p) : STG unit
  (requires G.pts_to r v_0 \_G.pts_to r v_1)
  (ensures λr → G.pts_to r (v_0 \_op \_v_1))
```

That is, knowledge that $r$ holds a composite value $v_0 \_op \_v_1$ can be traded back and forth with separate knowledge about each component. To enable this, SteelCore requires that every update to a reference be frame-preserving, i.e., knowing $G.pts_to r k$, an update should preserve all assertions $G.pts_to r k'$ that are compatible with $k$. 

```
**The FRAP PCM.** To define the FRAP PCM, we need some auxiliary notions of preorders and anchors. A preorder $v$ is a reflexive, transitive binary relation on $v$. The anchor relation $p$ is more interesting, and restricts the preorder as shown below. It may provide useful intuitions to think of anchor relation $p$, a binary relation on $v$, as a kind of measure of “distance”. With that, the first conjunct in the refinement of anchors below states that if $v_1$ is not too far ahead of $v_0$, then $v_1$ is also related to $v_0$ by the preorder $p$. The second conjunct says that if $z$ is not too far from $x$, then all $y$ that are between $x$ and $z$ according to the preorder are also not too far ahead of $x$. Note, anchor relation $p$ is not itself a preorder—it is certainly not transitive, and we don’t even require that it be reflexive.

```plaintext
let anchor_rel (∀Type) (p:preorder v) = anchors(v → v → prop) { 
  (v v0 v1. v0 `anchors` v1 => p v0 v1) ∧ 
  (v x z. x `anchors` z => (v y. p x y ∧ p y z => x `anchors` y)) 
}
```

Next, the carrier type knowledge $a$ of the PCM is shown below, where Nothing will be the unit of our PCM, and Owns $a$ represents some non-trivial knowledge.

```plaintext
type knowledge (a:anchor_rel p) =  
  | Owns : avalue a → knowledge a  
  | Nothing : knowledge a
```

An $a$-value $a$ (defined below) is a pair (perm, $h$) of a permission perm and a $h$-whist $p$, a type which encodes the entire $p$-preorder compatible history of values that will be stored at a ghost reference for this PCM. The whist $p$ construction existed previously in the Steel libraries and provides a generic way to turn a preorder $p$ into a PCM—see §4.5 of Swaney et al. [25]. We don’t say much more about it here, except that $cur v$ is the most recent value in the history. What is more interesting is the structure of $perm = ([op, oa])$, itself a pair of an optional fractional permission, where None represents a 0 permission (useful for snapshots, as we will see). Further, when $oa = Some a$, we say that the $a$-valued has an anchor $a$. The anchored $a$-valued refinement states that if $a$-valued has an anchor, then its current value is “not too far ahead” of the anchor.

```plaintext
let permission v = option perm & option v  
let anchored (arel:anchor_rel p) (pv:(permission v & whist p)) =  
  match pv with  
  | (_, Some a), v → a `arel` cur v | _ → ⊤  
let avalue a = aval((permission v & whist p) { anchored a av }
```

**Composability.** The composability of $v_0, v_1$: avalue $a$ (shown in Figure 2) is the key bit of the whole PCM, since it defines when one entity’s knowledge is compatible with another’s.

Suppose $v_0 = (p_0, h_0)$ and $v_1 = (p_1, h_1)$. To start with, $p_0$ is composable with $p_1$ if the sum of their fractions is no more than 1 and, importantly, if at most one of them has an anchor. Further, $h_0$ and $h_1$ must at least be composable in terms of the regular definition of composability of whist $p$, the history-based PCM for preorders, i.e., one of them must be an extension of the other, effectively forbidding “forks” in the history.

```plaintext
let avalue_composable ((p0, h0) (p1, h1)): avalue a =  
  permission_composable p0 p1 ∧ (h0 ≥ h1 ∧ h1 ≥ h0) ∧  
  (match p0, p1 with  
  | (None, None), (None, None) → ⊤  
  | (None, None), (Some _ _) → h1 ≥ h0  
  | (None, None), (_, Some a) → h0 ≥ h1 ⇒ a `arel` cur h0  
  | (Some _ _), (Some _ _) → h0 == h1  
  | (Some _ _), (_, Some a) → h0 ≥ h1 ∧ a `arel` cur h0  
  | ... remaining cases are symmetric  
)
```

**Figure 2.** The definition of composability for a FRAP

The rest of the definition is by case analysis on the permissions. If neither $p_0$ or $p_1$ holds any permission then no further constraints apply. Next, if $p_0$=None,None then we have two sub-cases: if $p_1$ holds some non-zero fraction, then $h_1$ must be more recent than $h_0$; otherwise, if $p_1$ holds an anchor $a$, and if $h_0$ is more recent than $h_1$, then its current value is still anchored by $v$, i.e., holding an anchor, even with a zero fraction, still prevents the state from evolving too far from the anchor. Finally, if both $p_0$ and $p_1$ hold some permission, then we have two sub-cases: if they hold non-zero fractions, then $h_0==h_1$; otherwise, exactly one of them can hold an anchor, and the other must hold a non-zero fraction (due to the composability of $p_0$ and $p_1$). If $p_0$ holds the anchor (call it $a$), then the history of $h_1$ must be more recent than $h_0$ but still be anchored by $a$. Remaining cases are symmetric, since composability must be a symmetric relation for a PCM. Note the interplay between fractions, preorders, and anchors—we don’t think there is a way to derive the FRAP from smaller, orthogonal PCMs.

**Composition.** Once composability is settled, defining the composition of knowledge $a$ is fairly obvious—Nothing is the unit, and to compose $v_0, v_1$: avalue $a$, we compose their permissions (summing their fractional permissions and retaining whichever anchor is present) and their histories (taking the most recent history).

Proving that all these definitions produce a PCM is almost entirely automated by F* and its Z3-assisted [10] typechecker—the hard part was settling on the definitions. What is more interesting are the lemmas that one can now prove about mutually compatible forms of knowledge.

**Some properties of snapshots.** A snapshot of $av$ retains its value while dropping all its permissions. For a $a$-value $a$, provided perm_ok $a$ (meaning that its fractional permission does not exceed 1, a basic well-formedness property), the lemma below proves that 1. one can always take a snapshot of a $a$-value $a$, since $a == a `compose` snapshot $a$, the share operation on a ghost reference can always be applied; 2. that snapshots are duplicable; and 3. that any knowledge $b$ composable with snapshot $a$, provided $b$ holds some non-zero permission (and hence is not a snapshot itself), must have...
With our generic FRAP construction in place, we turn to its knowledge. The most interesting part is eliminating (non-snapshot) knowledge.

Let `elim_anchor` = `let elim_anchor (_ : composable ` snapshot a ∧ snapshot a ` compose ` snapshot b) = snapshot a ∧ (∀ b : avalue s (has_perm b ∧ (b ` composable ` snapshot a))).` value_of (snapshot a) ≤ value_of b.\]

Some properties of anchors. While snapshots enable describing knowledge about some history of the system, anchors allow speaking about recent histories. The function `split_anchor` av splits the permissions associated with av into a fractional part and an anchored part. Lemma `split_anchor_props` states that one can always split knowledge of av into these two parts without losing any information. The most interesting part is `elim_anchor`: it states that if any (non-snapshot) knowledge a is composable with anchored knowledge b, then a's value is "not too far ahead" of b's anchor. The proofs are again automatic.

Let `split_anchor (((p, a), v); avalue s) = (((p, None), v), ((None, a), v))`. Lemma `let split anchored Props (av; avalue s (perm ok av)) : Lemma (let kv = split anchor av in kv ` composable ` ka ∧ kv ` composable ` ka =⇒ a ∧ snapshot a ` composable ` snapshot a ∧ snapshot a ` compose ` snapshot b =⇒ snapshot a ∧ (∀ b : avalue s (has_perm b ∧ (b ` composable ` snapshot a))). value of (snapshot a) ≤ value of b) = ()`. The proofs are again automatic.

Appendix B describes the usage of a FRAP for a simple scenario independent of FastVer2, involving two threads sharing a monotonic counter.  

4.3 A FRAP for FastVer2

With our generic FRAP construction in place, we turn to its instantiation in FastVer2. The specific anchor relation we use is shown below, where the first prefix of l that ends with a VerifyEpoch entry, or the empty log if there is no such entry, i.e., it precisely captures the state of a verifier thread that has been committed to the shared state. Note that is_last_committed is not reflexive in general: only empty logs or logs that end with a VerifyEpoch can be anchors, a useful property, as we will see shortly.

Let `log_grows` = `preorder log = l₀ l₁ → l₀ ≤ l₁` and `is_last_committed l₀ l₁ = l₀ ≤ l₁ ∧ l₀ =⇒ l₁`.  

\(^{F^*}\) can automatically prove that is_last_committed has type anchor_rel log grows which makes it easy to construct `log_frap`, a FRAP instance for this relation. This gives us a FRAP for a single log—to get a FRAP for all the logs, we use a Steel library to compose PCM’s pointwise to obtain a tlm (for thread-log map), a FRAP PCM for a map from tid (thread ids) to knowledge (avalue is_last_committed), the carrier of log_frap.

Let `log_frap = frac is_last_committed log_frap_let tlm = PCM_map pointwise tid log_frap_let tlm_carrier = map tid (knowledge (avalue is_last_committed)).`  

Finally, to model FastVer2’s ghost state, we introduce `mlogs = G ref tlm`, the type of a ghost reference that holds a thread-log map. This allows us to form assertions of the form `G pts r m`, where `m : tlm_carrier`. However, it is more convenient to work with several derived abstract predicates shown below.

Abstract predicates for thread-log maps. The predicate `tid pts_to r frac m anchor asserts frac knowledge on the state of all the threads, where sel m tid = Some log states that tid has processed exactly log, since frac is non-zero. Further, if anchor is true, then we can conclude that log is also exactly the committed state of tid. `tid pts to r tid f l a is just the singleton variant of tid pts to. We use tid pts to express a thread’s knowledge of its own state, i.e., in terms of Figure 1, tid pts to expresses the knowledge held in the thread-specific ghost references associated with `V₁, …, Vₙ`. Let `lmap = map tid (option log)` and `let rel dom (_ : lmap (k : tlm_carrier)) = ∀ tid. Some? (sel m tid) =⇒ Owns? (sel k tid)`. Let `let tids pts_to r mlogs (frac : perm) (m : lmap) (anchor : bool) = 3k. G pts to r k * pure (rel dom m k ∧ perm (Some frac) ∧ (tid tids pts to r tid f l a = tids pts to r f (singleton tid l)) a)`. We can also define predicates that hold only anchored or snapshot knowledge, without holding any fraction of the current knowledge of the thread state: `global anchor expresses anchored knowledge about all the threads (i.e., a recent history), while global snapshot expresses knowledge of some history of the threads. We elide their definitions, which are similar in structure to tids pts to.

Let `val global anchor (l : mlogs) (m : lmap) : vprop` and `val global snapshot (l : mlogs) (m : lmap) : vprop`. In terms of Figure 1, `global anchor` expresses the knowledge held in the black references that point back to the thread logs from the shared state. We will see a use of `global snapshot` in §4.5.

Valid triples and ghost-state transitions. Given the lemmas (like snapshot props and split anchor props) we’ve proven on FRAPs and also lemmas available for PCM maps, we can derive the following (ghost) operations—these are lemmas that prove the validity of certain Hoare triples, or
from the perspective of a logic like Iris [16] one may think of ghost operations as view shifts.

Our first pair of lemmas shows that non-anchored fractional knowledge can be split and recombed, like standard fractional permissions [6], but applied to our abstract predicate. The converse lemma that sums fractions is also provable, but we don’t show it here.

val share_tids_pts_to (xmlogs) (ml:map) : STG unit
  (requires tids_pts_to x f m false)
  (ensures _ → tids_pts_to x (half_perm f) m false)

Next, take_tid shows that one can extract knowledge about a single thread from collective knowledge about multiple threads—a fact that follows from structure of PCM maps. The converse lemma is also provable, though we do not show it here.

val take_tid (xmlogs) (ml:map) (t:tid (Some? (sel m t))) : STG unit
  (requires tids_pts_to x f m false)
  (ensures _ → tids_pts_to x t f (Some? v (sel m t)) false)

Next, following from split_anchor_props and elim_anchor, take_anchor shows that one can combine knowledge of the current state of a thread t’s log l with an anchor, taking ownership of the anchor from the global_anchor and conclude the anchor a = Some? v (sel m t) is the committed prefix of l.

val take_anchor x m (t:tid ((some? (sel m t)))) f l : STG unit
  (requires global_anchor x m * tid_pts_to x t f l false)
  (ensures _ → global_anchor x (upd m t None) false)

Conversely, a thread can cede ownership of an anchor back to the globalanchor, provided its current state l is fully committed.

val put_anchor x m t f (l: [[l==l]]) : STG unit
  (requires tid_pts_to x t f l true * global_anchor x m)
  (ensures _ → tid_pts_to x t f l false)

Next, update_log shows that if a thread owns full non-anchored permission to a log, it can extend the log so long as it does not include any more VerifyEpoch entries—this corresponds to the state transitions that an individual thread makes as it processes log entries and updates it thread-local state, without needing to synchronize with the shared state.

val update_log x t l0 (l1: log l0 ≤ l1 ∧ J1==J1) : STG unit
  (requires tid_pts_to x t full l0 false)
  (ensures _ → tid_pts_to x t full l1 false)

On the other hand, if a thread needs to update its log with a VerifyEpoch entry, it must hold anchored knowledge of its state and advance both its state and the anchor simultaneously. In other words, when processing a VerifyEpoch, a verifier thread Vt must first take knowledge of its anchor from the shared state using take_anchor, then transition using update_anchored_log, and finally return knowledge of the updated anchor to the shared state using put_anchor.

4.4 Main Data Structures and Invariants

All the state of the FastVer2 monitor is held in a top_level_state structure, shown below.

type top_level_state = { aeh:aggregate_epoch_hashes;
  all_threads:list (thread_state_and_lock aeh.mllogs) n_threads }

The top-level invariant, core_inv t, merely asserts some permission over the t.all_threads array and states that the thread with id i:tid is at position i in the array (ind_ok): the most interesting parts of the invariant are held in locks stored in other fields of the top-level state:

let core_inv t = \exists p v. A pts_to t all_threads p v * pure (ind_ok v)

The thread-local state is represented by the structure shown below, pairing the actual thread state ts with a lock, an instance of a cancellable lock, a wrapper around Steel’s verified implementation of a CAS-based spin lock, enabling the lock to be released while canceling the invariant that it protects (useful in case a verifier thread enters an unrecoverable error), while acquiring the lock only conditionally provides the invariant. Before calling any operation on a thread, this lock must be acquired, protecting against re-entrancy, and released before returning. Interestingly, the prior unverified implementation of FastVer neglected to protect against re-entrancy in this manner, leading to a potential source of attacks from a malicious service.

val thread_state_and_lock mllogs =
  i:tid; ts: thread_state tf thread_id ts == i;
  lock: Lock.cancellable_lock (\exists tsm. thread_inv ts mllogs tsm )

The invariant held by the lock, thread_inv, states that the concrete state of the thread reachable from ts is a refinement of ts:thread_state_model, the functional specification of a verifier thread’s state from §3; the verifier thread has not failed yet; and, it holds half permission to a non-anchored knowledge of the shared state map mllogs to assert that it has processed all the entries as required by the functional specification tsm.processed_entries. As we will see, the other half permission is passed to the context and used to specify the top-level incremental API.
We offer a precise, incremental API to the FastVer2 monitor validity of client operations.

The type of the aeh field is shown below: it stores the shared epoch hashes and related metadata from each thread, all protected by a cancellable lock that protects the main invariant on the aggregate state.

define argument aggregate_epoch_hashes (\{ hashes : epoch_tid_hashes; bitmaps : epoch_tid_bitmaps; max : R.ref (option epoch_id); mlogs : mlogs; \
lock : Lock.cancellable_lock \\ (agg_inv hashes bitmaps max mlogs) \})

The invariant agg_inv states that the hashes and bitmaps are maps (implemented using new libraries for hash tables that we programmed in Steel) that point to logical witnesses hv and bv (the latter used to record threads that have completed a given epoch); that max points to some max_v; and, importantly, that all these values are related to the functional correctness specification by hashes_bitmaps_max_ok of running all the verifiers on the logs mlogs_v, the logs corresponding to the last synchronized state of all the verifiers, expressed using the FRAP-based abstract predicate, global_anchor.

let agg_inv hashes bitmaps max mlogs = \exists hv bv max_v mlogs_v. \\
EpochMap pts_to hashes hv * \\
EpochMap pts_to full bitmaps bv * \\
pts_to max full max_v * \\
global_anchor mlogs (map_of_seq mlogs_v) * \\
true (hashes_bitmaps_max_ok hv bv max_v mlogs_v)

To update the aggregate state at the end of an epoch, a verifier thread must acquire aeh.lock, take ownership of its anchor, then update both the concrete and ghost state (the latter using update_anchored_log, as described in §4.3), put the updated anchor back, and release the lock. While this lock introduces some contention, we have not found this to be a performance bottleneck, since epoch boundaries are relatively sparse. Should this become an issue, with some more accounting, we believe verifier threads may propagate hashes into the aggregate state in lock-free manner.

4.5 Incremental API

We offer a precise, incremental API to the FastVer2 monitor intended for use by a verified context that also runs within the TEE. Such a verified context may provide services on top of the monitor, e.g., to issue signatures of attesting to the validity of client operations.

4.5.1 Initializing the monitor. Calling init () initializes n_threads (a compile-time constant) verifier threads.

let thread_inv ts mlogs tsm = \\
state_refinement ts tsm = pure (! tsm.failed) * \\
tid_pts_to mlogs tsm.thread_id half tsm.processed_entries false

val init (_:unit) : ST (ref top_level_state) \\
  (requires emp) \\
  (ensures \ lambda r => \exists t. pts_to r full t * core_inv t * ilogs t)

let log_of_tid t tid e = tid_pts_to t.aeh.mlogs half e
val verify_log (r : R.ref top_level_state) (itid) \\
  (input:array U8 len (len #0ul)) \\
  : ST (option verify_result) \\
  (requires pts_to r p t * core_inv t * A pts_to input lp lb * \\
  log_of_tid t i ents) \\
  (ensures \ lambda res with \\
    Some (Verify_success read wrote) -> \exists ents'. \\
    log_of_tid t i (ents @ ents') * \\
    pure (let s = verify_model (init_model tid) ents in \\
    let s' = verify_model s ents' in \\
    read == len \ \\
    parse_log_up_to lb (U32 v read) == Some ents') \\
    | _ -> \exists'. log_of_tid t tid e))

Figure 3. The specification of verify_log

where ilogs is defined as:

let ilogs t = \\
tids_pts_to t.aeh.mlogs half (const (Some empty)) false

Since its precondition is just emp, init () can be called at any time, including multiple times. It returns a fresh handle to an instance of the monitor, r of top_level_state, a concrete reference to top_level_state, an abstract type, such that, first, the caller has full permission to r, which points to some value ts, a logical witness to the value stored in the heap at r. Next, it (separately) provides an abstract predicate core_inv ts, encapsulating the main invariant of the monitor. The core_inv ts is duplicable, meaning that from core_inv ts it is possible to derive core_inv ts * core_inv ts. Finally, ilogs gives the caller half, non-anchored permission to the logs of all threads, each initialized to the empty sequence.

4.5.2 Verifying a log of operations. The signature of verify_log is shown in Figure 3. It is invoked to request a given thread i to verify some input log of entries. To call verify_log, the context prepares a log of binary-formatted entries in an input array of bytes, whose length is len. They then call verify_log r i input, passing in the top-level state handle r and requesting that the input be processed on thread i. The precondition requires passing in some permission p to the top-level state r and core_inv t, i.e., read permission is enough, enabling the context to simultaneously call verify_log r j on some other thread, since core_inv t is also duplicable. Finally, the precondition includes tid_pts_to stating that thread i must have processed exactly ents so far, which the context can obtain by using take_tid on the ilogs predicate.

When verify_log returns, if grants the caller permission to r, the core_inv, and the unchanged input array. If it returns successfully with some (Verify_success read wrote), then we provide a full functional correctness specification of how
We want our API to protect from some misuse by an untrusted caller, which allows the context to request the monitor to aggregate the results from all verifier threads and report up to which epoch verification has been completed. As a precondition, the context only needs to provide some permission to \( r \), ref top_level_state and the same permission is returned to the caller in the postcondition. The rest of the postcondition reflects the main partial correctness result of FastVer, in case \( \text{max\_certified\_epoch} \) returns \( \text{Read\_max\_some\_max} \).

4.5.3 Main theorem: Max certified epoch. The third and final operation in our top-level API is \( \text{max\_certified\_epoch} \), which allows the context to request the monitor to aggregate the results from all verifier threads and report up to which epoch verification has been completed. As a precondition, the context only needs to provide some permission to \( r \), ref top_level_state and the same permission is returned to the caller in the postcondition. The rest of the postcondition reflects the main partial correctness result of FastVer, in case \( \text{max\_certified\_epoch} \) returns \( \text{Read\_max\_some\_max} \).

The predicate \( \text{global\_snapshot\ t} (\text{map\_of\ seq\ logs}) \) says that all the threads have at least collectively processed the entries in logs, and since it is a FRAP snapshot, we can prove that logs is a valid history of the entire system. The rest of the postcondition relates this history to the correctness theorem of FastVer. That is, there exists an interleaving of all the get and put operations in the log, up to epoch max that is sequentially consistent, except if there is a hash collision—this is our main theorem.

4.6 A Verified Wrapper for TEEs

We want our API to protect from some misuse by an untrusted caller: we should not return or receive pointers to our internal state; we should defend against the context passing bogus pointers for the input log; and we need to remove as many of the preconditions to our operations as possible, since an unverified context may not respect them. To defend against such misuse, we write and verify a small wrapper for our API that runs within the TEE and presents the same operations purged of these attack surfaces.

**Top-level state.** The API shall not pass a ref top_level_state back and forth across the boundaries of the TEE. Indeed, if it does, then this could allow an untrusted caller to pass in a bogus pointer, leading to crashes or, worse, memory corruption and wrong results.

To defend against this, we store the top-level state as a global variable. Allocating such a state will create a permission to access it later, but by default, if we carelessly perform that allocation as an F* top-level variable, we lose that permission and we have no way to recover it. To avoid that situation, we store the permission in an invariant [26].

This is enough, since once the top-level state is allocated, it is read-only. While the invariant can be temporarily opened only to perform at most one atomic observable operation, our setting is actually weaker: we open the invariant only to duplicate the permission on the top-level state, which is possible by halving the permission on the reference and duplicating core_inv. This is proof-only, ghost code, so it is not even observable. Thus, our invariant is transparent to the user and has no observable impact on concurrent accesses.

**External input pointer.** The service calls \( \text{verify\_log} \) with a pointer to its input log. This exposes two problems. First, nothing prevents the service from passing garbage; however, the TEE has a primitive to check the validity of the pointer provided by the service. So, our verified code needs to make sure to call this primitive before accessing the pointer. Second, nothing guarantees that the service will not write to the input buffer while we are accessing it; thus we cannot assume that two successive reads to a given byte in the input buffer will always return the same result. So we need to make sure to read each input byte at most once. While EverParse allows generating input data validators formally guaranteed against double fetches [24], these validators do not cover the subset of EverParse that we are using for our log types. So, we need to allocate a temporary buffer and copy the contents of the input buffer there, and let the verifier operate from there. To solve both issues, we introduce an abstract type for externally-provided input pointers and a unique operation to copy its contents. That function will call the TEE pointer checker before copying and the abstract type forces us to use this operation before reading from such a pointer.

**Thread permission.** With the internal state properly hidden as a global variable, and the input buffer properly copied to a temporary buffer, the last precondition left for \( \text{verify\_log} \) is that the service have access permission on the thread on which they want to call the verifier. However, this precondition (\( \text{log\_of\_tid} \)) is needed only to state some property of ghost state of the verifier to relate the thread logs before and after the call.

Thus, we amend the incremental API described in 4.5 with a ghost boolean switch, true if we want to enable such incremental proof on \( \text{verify\_log} \). This boolean switch is ghost, so only specifications and proofs can branch on it, not the actual code. If set to true, then the caller needs to have one half of the fractional permission on the thread log, and the internal thread lock keeps the other half, as described in 4.4; but if set to false, no such caller permission is needed, and the internal thread lock keeps the full permission. Thus, this ghost
switch propagates up to the definition of the top_level_state and thread_state_and_lock types.

Then, verified applications can still use the incremental API with this ghost switch set to true, whereas for the hardened API for untrusted clients, we set this ghost switch to false. Anyway, the value of this ghost switch only impacts the correctness statement of verify_log, so the final theorem on max_certified_epoch still holds in both cases.

4.7 Some Statistics

We briefly cover some statistics about our development, aiming to characterize the effort involved in various aspects of the proof (Table 1). Our total development consists of nearly 50,000 lines of F* code, including comments (which we maintain as the code evolves), about 7,500 lines for the high-level specification and proof of FastVer, and various utilities we developed along the way, including data structures and libraries developed for Steel, e.g., various kinds of hash tables and arrays. We do not include any auto-generated code in this metric, e.g., the parsers, serializers, and their proofs generated by EverParse. The lowest level functional specification of our core implementation is about 1,500 lines and the main semantic proof, in about 8,000 lines, relates this functional specification to an intermediate level specification and produces our main correctness theorem.

Overall, the proof to executable code ratio is comparable to other developments, e.g., Hawblitzel et al. [14] report a proof-to-code ratio of about 5:1. The ratio of the core Steel implementation to the C code extracted from it is only around 2:1 and we are hopeful that with improvements to the Steel libraries and tactics, this ratio could be even smaller. The bulk of our development is, however, mathematical proofs about the protocol itself. Also, keep in mind that this effort represents a one-time cost of verifying the monitor, which can be used with much larger pieces of unverified code at a relatively small integration cost. The whole development takes about 20 minutes to verify using 8 cores on a standard Linux machine with 32GB of memory.

Our executable code also includes about 3,000 lines of C code for parsers auto-generated by EverParse from a data format description. We also used verified cryptographic primitives from HACL* [29] and EverCrypt [20]. This includes about 1,000 lines of C code for an implementation of the Blake2b hashing function. All these pieces of C code were verified using Low* [21], another F* DSL that produces C code. A caveat: Low* specifications are not formally relatable to Steel specifications, so we wrote small admitted wrappers for our Steel code to call into these Low* verified components. We are in the process of migrating our use of EverParse libraries to a Steel-based parser generator instead, which should allow us to remove some of these admitted wrappers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>F* LOC</th>
<th>C LOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghost state constructions</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Steel implementation</td>
<td>8,667</td>
<td>4,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest level functional spec</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Intermediate Simulation</td>
<td>7,863</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate spec, soundness</td>
<td>8,437</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FastVer spec, soundness</td>
<td>7,447</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libraries, utilities</td>
<td>11,563</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsers (EverParse)</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td>3,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptography (EverCrypt)</td>
<td>950</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>49,253</td>
<td>8,158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. A glance at the FastVer2 development, with lines of F* and extracted C code

Figure 4 presents a performance comparison between FastVer2 and FastVer, showing the overall maximum throughput (not constraining the latency) for the YCSB A benchmark (with an equal distribution of get and put operations) for
a database of size 16M records with 8-byte keys and values. FastVer2 sees a performance drop of around a factor of 5 compared to FastVer. Despite this drop, FastVer2 still achieves a throughput exceeding 10M ops/sec, which is 2-3 orders of magnitude better than any current formally verified key-value database [13]. Beyond the drop in throughput, the other performance characteristics of FastVer2 remain unchanged compared to FastVer. In particular, the throughput scales roughly linearly with the number of CPU cores.

We performed various micro-experiments to identify the main reasons for the lower throughput. The main contributor is the different implementations of the multi-set hash function: FastVer uses an AES-based construction leveraging the Intel aesni hardware instructions [9]; FastVer2 relies on a slower Blake2-based construction. On our setup, the AES-based implementation achieves around 200M incremental hash computations, while the Blake2-based one achieves around 4M computations, a 50x slowdown. When we replace the Blake2 based multi-set hash function with an efficient (but insecure) “dummy” hash function, the performance of FastVer2 increases by about 50%, reducing the throughput gap with FastVer to around 3x as shown in Figure 4.

Several other small inefficiencies cause the remaining performance gap. FastVer2 uses a byte-level xor’ing of 32 byte values during incremental hash computation, while FastVer uses word-level xor’ing (around 7% overhead). FastVer2 also currently involves (avoidable) memory allocation and deallocation on the hot-path (around 5% overhead). Some of the performance overheads arise from fixing legitimate bugs that our formalization found, e.g., FastVer2 uses a lock, incurring an overhead, to prevent re-entrancy for a verified thread, while FastVer, incorrectly, does not prevent it.

None of the above mentioned reasons for slowdown are fundamental. We plan to switch to an AES-based hash construction by using components from EverCrypt’s [20] AES-GCM implementation in assembly, which also uses aesni. The other inefficiencies (temporary allocations, optimized xor’ing, etc.) can also be eliminated with some code and proofs rearrangements. Nevertheless, we are encouraged that without any specific attention to optimization, FastVer2’s performance scales linearly with the number of cores and is within an order of magnitude of FastVer.

6 Related Work

We cover three strands of related work: verified implementations of authenticated data structures; program logics for reasoning about monotonicity; and hardening verified code to run in an unsafe context.

Authenticated data structures. While there have been many schemes and libraries proposed for designing and implementing authenticated data structures, only a few have actually built formally verified implementations, e.g., EverCrypt [20] offers a formally verified incremental Merkle tree. However, as far as we are aware, FastVer2 is the first fully verified implementation of a concurrency-capable authenticated data structure, supporting both sparse, incremental Merkle trees and delayed memory verification.

Program logics for monotonicity. Ahman et al. [3] design a Hoare logic for reasoning about programs whose state is required to evolve monotonically according to some preorder. However, their approach is not based on separation logic and does not support concurrency. Building on Ahman et al.’s approach, Swamy et al. [25] develop SteelCore, a PCM-based separation logic which supports reasoning about monotonic state. In particular, Swamy et al. show how to derive a PCM from any preorder, and prove that frame-preserving updates for that PCM are also preorder respecting. Their construction is based on ghost state that stores histories, the type vhist p that we use as a building block of the FRAP. Timany and Birkedal [28] also study reasoning about monotonicity in separation logic and present another construction to turn any preorder into a PCM. Rather than relying on histories, their construction is based on constructing a generic semi-lattice from a preorder. Earlier, and going back to Jensen and Birkedal’s [15] fictional separation logic, many others have developed PCM-based constructions for specific instances of monotonic state. As far as we are aware, no one else has proposed anchored preorders, which allows naturally modeling scenarios where state evolves monotonically, but one thread’s knowledge of the state cannot run too far ahead of another’s.

Hardening APIs for use in an untrusted context. Our safe API wraps our incremental API with runtime checks to ensure that adversarial code calling it cannot break its safety. We achieve this by relying on specific hardware protections provided by TEE APIs to check untrusted pointers. Agten et al. [2] study the problem of executing verified code in an untrusted context in depth and develop a generic class of runtime checks that can be used to protect such verified APIs, while also relying on some notion of module-private memory at runtime (which we realize using the TEE). We were concerned with protecting the FastVer2 API specifically, rather than developing a generic system for protecting a class of APIs, nevertheless, the similarity in approaches is striking. Also related are typing disciplines for security protocols that offer robust safety or Un-typed APIs for safe use in an attacker’s context [1, 12].

7 Conclusions

We have presented the design and implementation of a provably correct, concurrent monitor for key-value stores. By attaching our monitor to Faster, we have obtained a state-of-the-art, provably correct, high-performance key-value store, at a fraction of the effort of verifying Faster itself. Of course, our guarantees only cover safety, and there is always the possibility of runtime failure due to the monitor rejecting a
trace, but the trade-off in proof development effort makes our approach attractive.

Looking beyond key-value stores, we are currently developing a generic version of our monitor that can be instantiated with a user-chosen safety automata, aiming to use it to develop provably runtime-safe versions of a variety of other services.

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Appendices

A Background on F*

F* is a programming language and proof assistant based on a dependent type theory (like Coq, Agda, or Lean). F* also offers an effect system, extensible with user-defined effects, and makes use of SMT solving to automate some proofs.

F*'s toolchain includes support for several other embedded DSLs, notably Steel [11, 25], for reasoning about concurrent, imperative programs in a concurrent separation logic. Steel programs can be extracted from F* to C, and a metatheorem establishes that extracted C programs simulate the F* program. However, the tool implementing this extraction pipeline (named KaRaMeL), although modeled after this metatheory, is not formally verified and is part of our trusted computing base, which also includes the F* typechecker and the Z3 SMT solver.

Syntax: Binders, lambda, arrows, computation types. F* syntax is roughly modeled on OCaml (val, let, match etc.) with differences to account for the additional typing features. Binding occurrences b of variables take the form x.t, declaring a variable x at type t; or #x.t indicating that the binding is for an implicit argument. The syntax λ (b₁) ... (bₙ) → t introduces a lambda abstraction, whereas b₁ → ... → bₙ → c is the shape of a curried function type. Refinement types are written b[i], e.g., x:int{x≥0} is the type of non-negative integers (i.e., nat). As usual, a bound variable is in scope to the right of its binding; we omit the type in a binding when it is implicitly bound at the top, e.g., vec a m → vec a n → vec a (m+n).

B A FRAP for Counters

Back up for the moment from the specifics for FastVer2, consider the following simpler scenario. Say we have two threads sharing a mutable increment-only counter i. Thread P (the producer) atomically increments the counter, while thread C (the consumer) reads it. If P owns the assertion i → n, it should be able to update the state to i → m, only if m ≥ n. Meanwhile, if C owns the read-only assertion i → f(n), it should be able to conclude that reading i returns a value m ≥ n—this should be a fairly familiar scenario, explored by several papers related to separation logic and monotonic state, e.g., by Pilkiewicz and Pottier [19].

The twist here is to find a way to ensure that C’s knowledge of the value of i is never too far behind P’s knowledge of its current value. For example, when distributing permissions to the counter to P and C, we may decide that P must synchronize with C every time it increments the counter to the next even number. In particular, we say that the assertion i □ n anchors the counter at n, for some even number n, ensuring that P cannot advance the counter beyond n + 1; and when C reads the counter obtaining m it can conclude that m ≤ n + 1.

To model this scenario in Steel using a FRAP, one simply defines the preorder and anchors relation as shown below:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{let } & p : \text{preorder } \text{nat} = \lambda x y \to x \leq y \\
\text{let } & \text{at_most_one_away } : \text{anchor_rel } p = \\
& \quad \lambda x y \to x \% 2 = 0 \land x \leq y \land y \leq x + 1
\end{align*}
\]

Then, \( \text{frap at_most_one_away } \) is an instance of a FRAP.

Now, to work with ghost references that store values of frap at_most_one_away, one can define some derived notions, where \( r \xrightarrow{f} v \) represents fractional non-anchored knowledge of the contents of \( r \); \( r \xrightarrow{f} v \) anchors \( r \) to \( v \); \( r \xrightarrow{f} v \) anchors \( r \) to \( v \) while also holding fraction \( f \); and finally, \( r \xrightarrow{f} v \) is a snapshot of the contents of \( r \).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{let } & \text{whist } p v = h\text{whist } p \{ \text{cur } h = v \} \\
\text{let } & \text{frap at_most_one } = \exists(h\text{whist } p v). \text{G}.pts_to_r(\text{Owneds}(\text{Some } f, \text{None}, h)) \\
\text{let } & \text{frap f } = \exists(h\text{whist } p v(v\%2 = 0)). \\
\text{let } & \text{frap f } = \exists(h\text{whist } p v(v\%2 = 0)). \\
\text{let } & \text{frap f } = \exists(h\text{whist } p v(v\%2 = 0)).
\end{align*}
\]
The lemmas we’ve proven about the FRAP PCM show that the following Hoare triples are provable in Steel, starting with split_anchor which allows splitting our knowledge of the anchor into separate permissions to hand to P and C.

```plaintext
val split_anchor (r:G.ref (frap at_most_one_away)) : STG unit
  (requires r □→ v)
  (ensures λ_ ← r → v + r □→ v)

Next, snap allows taking snapshots and proving that snapshots are always valid histories.

```plaintext
val snap (r:G.ref (frap at_most_one_away)) : STG unit
  (requires r f→ v)
  (ensures λ_ → r f→ v + r □→ v)

val snap_hist (r:G.ref (frap at_most_one_away))
  : STG unit
  (requires r f→ v + r ∗ v)
  (ensures λ_ → r f→ v + r ∗ v’ + pure (v’ ≤ v))
```

Since only even values can be anchors, P can increment the counter to an odd value without synchronizing with C—this corresponds in FastVer2 to a thread advancing its state without traversing an epoch boundary and without synchronizing with the shared state.

```plaintext
val increment_odd (r:G.ref (frap at_most_one_away))
  : STG unit
  (requires r f→ v + pure (v\%2=0))
  (ensures r f→ (v + 1))
```

But, to increment the counter to the next even value requires gathering both knowledge of the current value of r as well as knowledge of its anchor, incrementing r and advancing the anchor to the next even value, which corresponds in FastVer2 to a verifier thread completing an epoch and synchronizing with the shared state.

```plaintext
val increment_even (r:G.ref (frap at_most_one_away))
  : STG unit
  (requires r f→ (v + 1) ∗ r □→ v)
  (ensures r f→ (v + 2) ∗ r □→ (v + 2))
```

## C Hardening the API

```plaintext
type state_t = {
  state_ref: ref top_level_state;
  ghost_state: Ghost.eraised top_level_state;
  inv: inv (∃ p. pts_to state_ref p ghost_state ∗
    core_inv ghost_state))
}

let state = begin
  let state_ref = init () in
  assert_ (∃ state . pts_to state_ref 1.0state ∗
    core_inv state);
  let ghost_state = elim_∃ () in
  let _inv = new_invariant
    (∃ p. pts_to state_ref p ghost_state ∗
      core_inv ghost_state)) in
  return
    ((state_ref = state_ref;
      ghost_state = ghost_state;
      _inv = _inv);)
end <: STT state_t emp (λ_ → emp)
```

In practice, the initializer needs to be called upon start. Instead, we could also allow the user to initialize the top-level state later as they wished. To this end, we would allocate a ref (ref top_level_state) initially set to NULL. The invariant as designed makes the ref read-only, and even if we constrained the permission held in the invariant to be equal to 1 if the state is uninitialized, this would not be enough, since we need to check that the reference is null before updating it with a fresh top-level state, both of which cannot be done together atomically. So, we need to create a lock to protect that reference. A lock alone could be enough for safety, but it would actually prevent all concurrency. Thus, we need to keep the invariant, and say that the lock and the invariant each hold some (potentially different) permission on the reference, and that the sum of the two permissions equals 1 as long as the reference points to NULL. Then, when the user explicitly initializes the top-level state, we acquire the lock, allocate a top-level state, then we open the invariant, and we atomically set the ref to the fresh top-level state, and finally we can close the invariant and release the lock. Then, once the top-level state is initialized, the reference becomes read-only and the invariant is enough as before, the lock no longer be acquired.
References


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